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Abstract
In this paper, I survey experimental studies on duopolistic quantity competition with
homogeneous products and duopolistic price competition with heterogeneous products.
The focus is on the papers in which the sequence of competition is endogenous. Ex-
perimental studies checking Cournot competition against Stackelberg competition act
as benchmarks. I ﬁnd that while Stackelberg equilibrium outcomes are seldom under
quantity competition, under price competition, the Stackelberg equilibrium prediction
seems to be more appropriate. However, after discussing the experimental setups, I
conclude that some methodological problems are present. Moreover, I make recommen-
dations for further research.
Keywords: Cournot competition, simultaneous competition, simultaneous play, Stackel-
berg competition, sequential competition, sequential play, duopoly, homogeneous prod-
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1 Introduction
Although the Cournot model and the Stackelberg model of duopolistic quantity competi-
tion with homogeneous products and duopolistic price competition with heterogeneous
products are part and parcel of every textbook on industrial organization,1 only few
experiments testing these models have been conducted yet. The same is true for models
in which the sequence of competition is endogenous. In the following, these models are
referred to as ESoC models.
An ESoC model is a model in which the sequence of competition is not exogenously
given but endogenously determined by the ﬁrms’ decisions. The two most often used
ESoC models were built by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990): the extended game with action
commitment and the extended game with observable delay. For example, van Damme and
Hurkens (1999) apply Hamilton and Slutsky’s extended game with action commitment
to quantity competition between ﬁrms which are asymmetric with respect to marginal
costs. Another ESoC model is Saloner’s (1987) extended game with two investment
periods which has been improved by Ellingsen (1995).
Experimental studies on the Cournot and the Stackelberg quantity competition models
were done by Huck et al. (2001) and Fonseca et al. (2005). Saloner’s model was experi-
mentally examined by Mu¨ller (2006), and Hamilton and Slutsky’s models were tested by
Huck et al. (2002) and Fonseca et al. (2006). Further, Fonseca et al. (2005) also exper-
imentally investigated van Damme and Hurkens’s model. The only experimental study
checking Cournot price competition against Stackelberg price competition was done by
1Most often, textbook authors speak of the Bertrand model when they refer to simultaneous price
competition. Since Bertrand has argued with homogenous products exclusively and Cournot has
applied his equilibrium concept not only to quantity competition but also to price competition,
following Morrison (1998), I say Cournot quantity (price) competition when I refer to simultaneous
quantity (price) competition with homogeneous (heterogeneous) products. When I refer to sequential
quantity (price) competition with homogeneous (heterogeneous) products, I say Stackelberg quantity
(price) competition.
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Ku¨bler and Mu¨ller (2002). Moreover, none of the ESoC price competition models has
been experimentally examined yet. For example, such models were published by Hamil-
ton and Slutsky (1990), van Damme and Hurkens (2004), Pastine and Pastine (2004),
and Amir and Stepanova (2006).
In Cournot quantity competition markets, Huck et al. (2001) and Fonseca et al. (2005)
ﬁnd evidence for the Cournot equilibrium prediction. In contrast, Stackelberg equilib-
rium outcomes are seldom in Stackelberg quantity competition markets. In endogenous
Stackelberg quantity competition markets, the Stackelberg equilibrium prediction is even
worse. In Stackelberg price competition markets, the Stackelberg equilibrium prediction
seems to be more appropriate.
Consequently, I raise the following ﬁve questions: (i) Has the Cournot quantity compe-
tition model been corroborated and the Stackelberg quantity competition model been
falsiﬁed by Huck et al. (2001) and Fonseca et al. (2005)? (ii) Did Mu¨ller (2006), Huck
et al. (2002), Fonseca et al. (2006), and Fonseca et al. (2005) falsify the endogenous
Stackelberg quantity competition models? That is, is it not possible to explain sequen-
tial quantity competition by these models? (iii) Did Ku¨bler and Mu¨ller (2002) ﬁnd
evidence for the Cournot and the Stackelberg price competition model? (iv) What can
be expected from further research on price competition? In particular, will it be possible
to explain price leadership by the proposed endogenous Stackelberg price competition
models? (v) How should further experimental research on oligopoly models be orga-
nized?
In the following section, I recapitulate the experiments on quantity competition. After
that, I investigate Mu¨ller’s (2006) experiment on price competition. The ﬁndings are
discussed in section 4. In the last section, I conclude.
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2 Quantity Competition
2.1 Experiments on Models With an Exogenous Sequence of
Competition
In a series of experiments, Huck et al. (2001) examine two markets for a homogeneous
good. In every market, two ﬁrms compete in quantities. Both ﬁrms face a linear inverse
demand function: 푝(푞) = max{30 − 푞, 0}, 푞 = 푞1 + 푞2. Each cost function is linear in
output: 푐푖(푞푖) = 6푞푖, 푖 = 1, 2. Hence, marginal costs are constant and identical. In
the Cournot market, ﬁrms act simultaneously. In the Stackelberg market, ﬁrms move
sequentially.
The Cournot and Stackelberg equilibrium predictions as well as the predicted outcomes
under collusion are shown in Table 1. The focus is on the Stackelberg market treatments,
the Cournot market treatments serve as control treatments. By means of their setup,
Huck et al. test whether subjects behave according to an asymmetric subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium prediction.
Prediction Cournot Stackelberg Collusion
Quantities 푞퐶
푖
= 푞퐶3−푖 = 8 푞
퐿
푖
= 푞퐿3−푖 = 12, 푞
퐹
푖
= 푞퐹3−푖 = 6 푞
퐽
푖
= 푞퐽3−푖 = 6
Total quantity 푞퐶 = 16 푞푆 = 18 푞퐽 = 12
Proﬁts 휋퐶
푖
= 휋퐶3−푖 = 64 휋
퐿
푖
= 휋퐿3−푖 = 72, 휋
퐹
푖
= 휋퐹3−푖 = 36 휋
퐽
푖
= 휋퐽3−푖 = 72
Total welfare 푇푊퐶 = 256 푇푊 푆 = 270 푇푊 퐽 = 216
Table 1: Cournot and Stackelberg equilibrium predictions.
Source: Huck et al. (2001, p. 751).
The experiment was run in lecture halls with pen and paper at Humboldt University
Berlin. Overall, 134 students from various ﬁelds of study, mostly from economics and
business administration as well as law, participated in 7 sessions. Every session consisted
of 10 rounds and lasted between 60 and 75 minutes. Participants’ average earnings were
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e 8.01. Each subject was told to “play the role of a ﬁrm” and had to choose its quantity
from a 13× 13 payoﬀ bimatrix.
For Cournot markets, Huck et al. ﬁnd that, under random matching, average quantities
per round are close to the Nash equilibrium quantities; under ﬁxed matching, aver-
age quantities per round are lower because the collusive quantity is chosen more often.
Further, there is a noticeable endgame eﬀect under ﬁxed matching: collusion breaks
down in the last rounds. That is, under random matching, the theoretical predictions
are supported to a large extent. For Stackelberg markets, the picture is diﬀerent: un-
der random matching, leaders mostly supply less than predicted by the subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium, and followers typically supply more; under ﬁxed matching, ﬁrms com-
pete less intensively at large. Thus, the experimental results diﬀer from the theoretical
predictions. However, as predicted, because of the higher total output, the Stackelberg
markets are associated with a higher welfare than the Cournot markets.
2.2 Experiments on Models With an Endogenous Sequence of
Competition
Huck et al. (2002) use the same 13 × 13 payoﬀ bimatrix as Huck et al. (2001). In
addition, to endogenize the order of moves, they extend the quantity-choosing game by
a time-setting game. Following Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), according to the extended
game with action commitment, ﬁrms are able to choose their quantities in one of two
periods. If a ﬁrm commits to a quantity in the ﬁrst period (moves early), it does not
know whether the other ﬁrm also moves early or commits to a quantity in the second
period (moves late, waits). By waiting until the second period, a ﬁrm is able to observe
the other ﬁrm’s action of the ﬁrst period. The market is assumed only to exist in
the second period, therefore, proﬁts from simultaneous play in the ﬁrst period are the
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same as proﬁts from simultaneous play in the second period. The extensive form of the
extended game with action commitment is depicted in Figure 1.
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푞
2
wait
푞
푞
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wait
1
푞
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wait
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Figure 1: Extensive form of Hamilton and Slutsky’s (1990, p. 35) extended game with
action commitment.
After the elimination of weakly dominated strategies, the extended game exhibits two
subgame-perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies: one of the two ﬁrms moves early and
the other one moves late. Besides these two equilibria, a Stackelberg equilibrium in mixed
strategies exists: both ﬁrms commit themselves to 푞 = 10 with a probability of 2/5 and
wait with a probability of 3/5. Before the elimination, another subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies is present: both ﬁrms choose their Cournot equilibrium
quantity in the ﬁrst period. Moreover, in weakly dominated strategies, there is a variety
of equilibria in mixed strategies. Huck et al. are interested in checking Hamilton and
Slutsky’s prediction of endogenous Stackelberg competition. By means of their setup,
Huck et al. check whether subjects eliminate weakly dominated strategies.
The computerized experiment was run at Humboldt University Berlin. Overall, 70
students from various ﬁelds of study, mostly from economics and business administration
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as well as law, participated in 7 sessions: 4 sessions with a small version of the payoﬀ
bimatrix and 3 sessions with a large version. Every session consisted of 10 rounds. The 3
sessions with the large bimatrix, each consisting of 30 rounds, lasted about 90 minutes;
the 4 sessions with the small bimatrix, each consisting of 10 rounds, lasted about 50
minutes. Participants’ average earnings were e 10.53 in the sessions with 30 rounds and
e 8.80 in the sessions with 10 rounds. Each subject was told to “have the role of a ﬁrm.”
For the large bimatrix, consisting of 13 rows and 13 columns, Huck et al. ﬁnd that,
under random matching, endogenous Stackelberg equilibria are extremely seldom, and
their frequency does not increase with experience. Further, participants have problems
in coordinating their actions: in about 25 percent of all rounds, coordination fails. Over
time, the frequency of collusive quantities increases because endogenous Stackelberg
followers reward cooperation/punish exploitation more often. Cournot equilibria are the
most frequent outcomes. For the small bimatrix, consisting of 3 rows and 3 columns,
the picture is the same. Hence, Huck et al. conclude that the failure of Hamilton and
Slutsky’s theoretical prediction of endogenous Stackelberg competition is not due to the
complexity of the large bimatrix. Further, they record that subjects seem to prefer
symmetric outcomes to asymmetric outcomes, but they are sceptical whether this result
is the same for markets with asymmetric ﬁrms or price competition.
Hamilton and Slutsky’s (1990) extended game with action commitment is also used by
Fonseca et al. (2005). Adopting the idea of Huck et al. (2002), ﬁrms are asymmetric
with respect to marginal costs. Both ﬁrms face a linear inverse demand function: 푝(푞) =
max{30−푞, 0}, 푞 = 푞1+푞2. Each cost function is linear in output: 푐1(푞1) = 6푞1, 푐2(푞2) =
8푞2. Again, the extended game exhibits three subgame-perfect Nash equilibria in pure
strategies: one subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in weakly dominated strategies in
which both ﬁrms choose their Cournot equilibrium quantity in the ﬁrst period and two
subgame-perfect Nash equilibria in which one of the two ﬁrms moves early and the other
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one moves late.
For this setup of the game, van Damme and Hurkens (1999) predict sequential play with
a speciﬁc order of play: since committing early is risky, the ﬁrm for which committing
early is less risky is expected to be the leader. Using Harsanyi and Selten’s (1988) risk
dominance criterion, van Damme and Hurkens show that committing early is less risky
for the low-cost ﬁrm, that is, only the Stackelberg equilibrium, in which the low cost
ﬁrm leads, survives the reﬁnement. By means of their setup, Fonseca et al. test whether
subjects eliminate weakly dominated strategies and select equilibria according to the
risk dominance criterion.
The Cournot and Stackelberg equilibrium predictions are shown in Table 2.
Prediction Cournot Stackelberg: LF Stackelberg: FL
Quantities 푞퐶1 =
52
6
, 푞퐶2 =
40
6
푞퐿1 =
78
6
, 푞퐹2 =
27
6
푞퐹1 =
42
6
, 푞퐿2 =
60
6
Total quantity 푞퐶 = 92
6
푞푆
퐿퐹
= 105
6
푞푆
퐹퐿
= 102
6
Proﬁts 휋퐶1 =
5408
72
, 휋퐶2 =
3200
72
휋퐿1 =
6084
72
, 휋퐹2 =
1458
72
휋퐹1 =
3528
72
, 휋퐿2 =
3600
72
Total welfare 푇푊퐶 = 17072
72
푇푊 푆
퐿퐹
= 18567
72
푇푊 푆
퐹퐿
= 17532
72
Table 2: Cournot and Stackelberg equilibrium predictions.
Source: Author.
The experiment was run in lecture rooms with pen and paper at the University of
London. Overall, 60 students participated in 6 sessions.2 Every session consisted of 20
rounds.3 Participants’ average earnings were e 13.63.4 Again, each subject was told to
“play the role of a ﬁrm” and had to choose its quantity from a 15× 15 payoﬀ bimatrix.
Fonseca et al. ﬁnd that, under random matching, endogenous Stackelberg equilibria are
seldom: only in 31 percent of all rounds, the low-cost ﬁrm emerges as the endogenous
leader; the high-cost ﬁrm is observed to be the leader in 18 percent of all rounds. In
2Fonseca et al. do not divulge the ﬁelds of study.
3The duration of the sessions is not divulged either.
4Fonseca et al. report £ 8.30. Since they did not mention the date when the experiment was run, the
exchange rate of December 28, 2001 was used for the calculation.
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the residual rounds, simultaneous play occurred – mostly in the ﬁrst period. Further,
there is no trend towards the risk-dominant equilibrium over time. Compared with
the experimental results of Huck et al. (2002), ﬁrms’ timing decisions are nearly iden-
tical. Furthermore, ﬁrms’ output decisions are not in accordance with van Damme and
Hurkens’ prediction: when a ﬁrm, no matter which type, commits in the ﬁrst period, it
produces approximately the Cournot output on average. Thus, low-cost ﬁrms are not
able to exploit their eﬃciency advantage to become Stackelberg leaders.
The payoﬀ bimatrix generated by Huck et al. (2001) is also used by Fonseca et al. (2006).
In contrast to Huck et al. (2002), Fonseca et al. employ Hamilton and Slutsky’s (1990)
extended game with observable delay to endogenize the order of moves. The extensive
form of the extended game with observable delay is depicted in Figure 2.
1
2
ﬁrst period
1
ﬁrst period
2
푞
푞
2
푞
1
second period
2
푞
푞
2
푞
2
second period
2
ﬁrst period
1
푞
푞
1
푞
1
second period
2
푞
푞
2
푞
Figure 2: Extensive form of Hamilton and Slutsky’s (1990, p. 33) extended game with
observable delay.
Firms simultaneously announce a production period and then they produce in the an-
nounced sequence. Since duopolistic quantity competition is associated with decreasing
reaction functions, each ﬁrm prefers its Cournot equilibrium payoﬀ to its Stackelberg
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equilibrium follower payoﬀ. Thus, in equilibrium, both ﬁrms announce the ﬁrst period
and achieve Cournot payoﬀs. By means of their setup, Fonseca et al. test whether
subjects behave according to a symmetric subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium prediction
in a more complex game than the standard Cournot game.
The computerized experiment was run at the University of London. Overall, 70 students
from various ﬁelds of study participated in 7 sessions: 5 sessions with random matching
and 2 sessions with ﬁxed matching. In order to allow for learning, the random-matching
sessions consisted of 30 rounds. The ﬁxed-matching sessions consisted of 10 rounds.
Every session lasted between 60 and 90 minutes. Participants’ average earnings were
e 21.38. Again, each subject was told to “have the role of a ﬁrm.”
Fonseca et al. ﬁnd that, under random matching, there is a trend towards equilibrium
timing behavior. However, the relative frequency of decisions for the ﬁrst period does not
exceed 72 percent. Further, the equilibrium prediction that both ﬁrms decide for the ﬁrst
period only occurs in 55 percent of the cases. In these simultaneous quantity choosing
subgames, ﬁrms’ quantity choices are almost identical and move towards the Cournot
prediction. In the sequential quantity choosing subgames, ﬁrst movers’ outputs are
smaller than the Stackelberg prediction, but larger than the Cournot prediction. That
is, both leaders’ and followers’ payoﬀs are smaller than Cournot players’ payoﬀs. Under
ﬁxed matching, the relative frequency of decisions for the ﬁrst period is lower: about
50 percent. The equilibrium prediction that both ﬁrms decide for the ﬁrst period only
occurs in 32 percent of the cases. In all quantity choosing subgames, average outputs are
lower than in the random-matching treatments, indicating a tendency to collude. That
is, ﬁrms’ payoﬀs are higher than in the random-matching treatments. Compared with the
results above, Fonseca et al.’s ﬁndings are puzzling: although there is a unique symmetric
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (coordination failures or inequality aversion are no
problems) and experienced subjects mostly choose the Cournot quantity, there is a
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tendency to wait for the second period. That is, the experimental result does not
completely support the theoretical prediction.
As Huck et al. (2001), Mu¨ller (2006) experimentally investigates two markets for a
homogeneous good. In every market, two ﬁrms compete in quantities. Both ﬁrms face
a linear inverse demand function: 푝(푞) = max{100 − 푞, 0}, 푞 = 푞1 + 푞2. Each cost
function is linear in output: 푐푖(푞푖) = 1푞푖, 푖 = 1, 2. Hence, marginal costs are constant
and identical. In one market, the Cournot market, ﬁrms act simultaneously. In the
other market, the order of moves is endogenous.
According to Saloner (1987) and Ellingsen (1995), there are two periods in which ﬁrms
are able to produce their outputs. The outputs simultaneously chosen in the ﬁrst period
are public information in the second period. Therefore, in the second period, ﬁrms
simultaneously choose their additional (nonnegative) outputs fully aware of the actions
in the ﬁrst period. After the second period, the market clears. As in Hamilton and
Slutsky’s (1990) extended game, production costs are assumed to be the same in both
periods. Saloner shows that any outcome on the outer envelope of the reaction functions
between and including the ﬁrms’ Stackelberg points (푆퐿퐹 , 푆퐹퐿) constitutes a subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium. This set is depicted in Figure 3. Ellingsen complements
Saloner’s analysis by demonstrating that only Stackelberg behavior survives the iterative
elimination of weakly dominated strategies. That is why he predicts that one of the two
Stackelberg outcomes will occur. By means of his setup, Mu¨ller checks whether subjects
iteratively eliminate weakly dominated strategies.
The computerized experiment was run at Humboldt University Berlin and the University
of London. Overall, 40 students participated in 20 sessions: 10 sessions with a Saloner-
Ellingsen duopoly treatment and 10 sessions with a Cournot duopoly treatment.5 Every
session consisted of 25 rounds. The 10 sessions with the Saloner-Ellingsen duopoly
5Mu¨ller does not divulge the ﬁelds of study.
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푞1
푞2
푟1
푟2
b 퐶
bc 푆퐿퐹
bc 푆퐹퐿
Figure 3: Reaction curves and equilibria.
treatment lasted about 80 minutes; the 10 sessions with the Cournot duopoly treatment
lasted about 45 minutes. Participants’ average earnings were e 17.44. Each subject was
told to “represent a ﬁrm.”
Mu¨ller ﬁnds that, under ﬁxed matching, Stackelberg equilibrium outcomes are extremely
rare in the Saloner-Ellingsen duopoly treatment: only 8 out of 250 quantity combinations
are classiﬁed as Stackelberg outcomes.6 Compared with the outcomes in the standard
Cournot duopoly treatment, these outcomes are not associated with higher total quan-
tities. An endgame eﬀect is observed in both treatments: total quantities rise in the last
rounds – and are close to the Cournot equilibrium prediction. That is, the experimental
result does not support Ellingsen’s theoretical prediction of Stackelberg behavior.
3 Price Competition
Ku¨bler and Mu¨ller (2002) experimentally examine two markets for a heterogeneous good.
In every market, two ﬁrms compete in prices. Both ﬁrms face a linear demand function:
6Since participants choose quantities from a ﬁnite grid, outcomes are classiﬁed as equilibrium outcomes
if they do not deviate more than 10 percent from the equilibrium prediction.
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푞푖(푝푖, 푝3−푖) = max{16− 2푝푖 + 푝3−푖, 0}, 푖 = 1, 2. Production is costless. Hence, marginal
costs are constant, identical, and zero. In the Cournot market, ﬁrms act simultaneously.
In the Stackelberg market, ﬁrms move sequentially.
The Cournot and Stackelberg equilibrium predictions as well as the predicted outcomes
under collusion are shown in Table 3. Roughly speaking, Ku¨bler and Mu¨ller carry over
Huck et al.’s (2001) experimental design to price competition. By means of their setup,
Ku¨bler and Mu¨ller test whether subjects behave according to an asymmetric subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium prediction.
Prediction Cournot Stackelberg Collusion
Prices 푝퐶
푖
= 푝퐶3−푖 = 4 푝
퐿
푖
= 푝퐿3−푖 = 6, 푝
퐹
푖
= 푝퐹3−푖 = 5 푝
퐽
푖
= 푝퐽3−푖 = 8
Proﬁts 휋퐶
푖
= 휋퐶3−푖 = 53 휋
퐿
푖
= 휋퐿3−푖 = 58, 휋
퐹
푖
= 휋퐹3−푖 = 68 휋
퐽
푖
= 휋퐽3−푖 = 65
Table 3: Cournot and Stackelberg equilibrium predictions.
Source: Ku¨bler and Mu¨ller (2002, p. 1442).
The computerized experiment was run at Humboldt University Berlin in June 2000 and
in January and May 2001. Overall, 120 students, undergraduates as well as graduates,
from various ﬁelds of study, mostly from economics and business administration, partic-
ipated in 10 sessions. Every session consisted of 15 rounds and lasted about 50 minutes.
Participants’ average earnings were e 8.69. Each subject was told to “play the role of a
ﬁrm” and had to choose its price from a 10× 10 payoﬀ bimatrix.
For Cournot markets, Ku¨bler and Mu¨ller ﬁnd that, under random matching, median
prices of the last 5 rounds match the Nash equilibrium prices; under ﬁxed matching,
median prices of the last 5 rounds are higher. That is, the behavior is more collusive
under ﬁxed matching than under random matching. This result also holds for the mean
prices. Therefore, under random matching, the theoretical predictions are supported to
a large extent. For Stackelberg markets, the picture is similar: under random matching,
median prices of the last 5 rounds match the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium prices;
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under ﬁxed matching and a sequential course of action (in contrast to the strategy
method), the median prices of the last 5 rounds are identical to the median prices
under random matching. Under ﬁxed matching and Selten’s (1967) strategy method,
the leader’s median price of the last 5 rounds equates to the follower’s median price.
However, for all treatments, mean leader prices (no matter whether all rounds or only
the last 5 rounds are considered) exceed mean follower prices, and mean follower proﬁts
exceed mean leader proﬁts. Thus, the experimental results widely match the theoretical
predictions in the Cournot market treatments as well as in the Stackelberg market
treatments.
4 Discussion
First of all, it is surprising that only a handful of experiments checking Cournot compe-
tition against Stackelberg competition have been published yet. It is also surprising that
only one of these experiments involves price competition. Although the Cournot model
and the Stackelberg model are part and parcel of every textbook on industrial organi-
zation, and there is a long history of characterizing oligopolistic industries by models of
price competition, in particular by price leadership models,7 an extensive experimental
investigation has not been performed yet.
A reason for this may be that experimental methods in this ﬁeld of research are seen
as inappropriate. That is, echoing Friedman (1953), that the domain of the theory is
seen to exclude the laboratory. To investigate whether using the laboratory is feasible,
following Cubitt (2005), I start from identifying the formal objects of the theory. These
are players, actions, payoﬀs, and information. Players act simultaneously or sequentially.
7For the classical price leadership models, see Forchheimer (1908) in conjunction with Zeuthen (1930),
Stigler (1947), and Markham (1951). For a survey of these models, see Scherer and Ross (1990, p.
248–261).
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They are assumed to be rational and to maximize their payoﬀs. The domain, which is
the set of real phenomena to which the theory is intended to apply, consists of ﬁrms
that compete duopolistically in quantities or prices for proﬁts. Now, the question is: Is
it possible to ﬁnd an experimental design within the domain of the theory? Presuming
that the theory is general, the answer is yes in principle. Participants can be told that
they represent ﬁrms, choose quantities or prices under a given sequence of competition,
and receive proﬁts subject to their chosen actions. However, the answer depends on the
auxiliary hypothesis that ﬁrms act like subjects. In addition, Binmore (1999) insists that
economic theory is only expected to predict in the laboratory if the experimental design
is not only in the domain of the theory but also provides “simple” tasks, “suﬃcient”
time for learning, and “adequate” incentives.
All published experiments fulﬁll these criteria to a large extent. If the auxiliary hypoth-
esis is taken to be true, experimental designs seem to be in the domain of the theory.
The judgement of simplicity of tasks, the suﬃciency of time for learning, and the ad-
equacy of incentices depends on the quantiﬁcation of simple, suﬃcient, and adequate.
In all mentioned experiments, tasks seem to be simple. Participants are told that they
represent ﬁrms, choose quantities or prices under a given sequence of competition, and
receive proﬁts subject to their chosen actions. Except for Mu¨ller’s (2006) experiment,
participants choose quantities or prices from a bimatrix. In Mu¨ller’s experiment, par-
ticipants choose quantities from a ﬁnite grid.8 Contemplating the time for learning, the
picture is mixed. Some sessions consist of 30 rounds. Others only have 10 rounds. In-
centives seem to be adequate: payoﬀs are chosen to reﬂect opportunity costs. Therefore,
an adverse selection among potential participants is avoided. If payoﬀs were chosen not
to reﬂect opportunity costs, it would have been likely that income-maximizing subjects
8In a Cournot oligopoly experiment, Gu¨rerk and Selten (2010) observe a presentation eﬀect under
ﬁxed matching: subjects who are given payoﬀ bimatrices choose collusive quantities more often
than subjects who are given a proﬁt calculator instead. However, under random matching, there
should be no such presentation eﬀect.
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would not have participated in the experiment.
However, the slopes of the reaction curves are small in magnitude, that is, losses from
playing a disequilibrium strategy, which is in the neighborhood of the equilibrium strat-
egy, are low. This can be a problem. For instance, Goeree and Holt (2001) present an
experiment on Basu’s (1994) “traveler’s dilemma” game. Two players simultaneously
select an integer between and including 180 and 300. If they have selected diﬀerent
numbers, both players are paid according to the lower of the two numbers, and, in ad-
dition, a transfer 푅 > 1 is added to the payoﬀ of the player with the lower number and
subtracted from the payoﬀ of the player with the higher number. If they have selected
identical numbers, both players are paid according to their numbers. In the unique Nash
equilibrium, both players select the number 180. That is, the theoretical prediction is
180. Since 푅 is the cost of being undercut, Goeree and Holt speculate that the behavior
might depend on the value of 푅. In particular, they conjecture: the higher the value
of 푅, the better is the Nash equilibrium prediction. To investigate their conjecture,
they implement two treatments: a treatment with 푅 = 푅ℎ = 180 and a treatment with
푅 = 푅푙 = 5. The experiment was run at the University of Virginia. Overall, 50 students
from undergraduate economics classes participated. All participants made decisions in
both treatments. In both treatments, the game was only played once. These two games
were presented randomly arranged and separated by a number of other games. Goeree
and Holt ﬁnd that about 80 percent of all participants choose the Nash equilibrium
strategy in the 푅ℎ treatment. However, in the 푅푙 treatment, the Nash equilibrium strat-
egy is only chosen by about 10 percent of all participants. Moreover, about 80 percent
of all participants choose 300, that is, they choose the strategy which is at the opposite
end of the strategy set.
Smith and Walker (1993) report on similar ﬁndings in 31 experiments: the higher the
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payoﬀs are, the better is the prediction and the lower is the variance.9 They argue that
this is based on decision costs. Decision costs are caused by the eﬀort to decide. In their
eyes, the decision problem is one of balancing the beneﬁt against the costs of reducing
the deviation. If decision costs are assumed to decrease with increasing simplicity and
experience, then it follows that simplifying the instructions and playing more rounds
will increase the predictive power of a true theory. In addition, the predictive power of
a true theory is increased by increasing the payoﬀ level: this causes an increase in eﬀort.
Regarding the experiments mentioned above, although the payoﬀs are chosen to reﬂect
opportunity costs, incentives for choosing the equilibrium strategy are low due to the
payoﬀ level in connection with the “ﬂat” reaction curves. The role of decision costs could
have been analyzed by Ku¨bler and Mu¨ller (2002) without additional treatments. Since
undergraduates as well as graduates participate in their experimental study and decision
costs are likely to be lower for graduates than for undergraduates, a separate evalua-
tion of the two groups seems to be promising. However, due to the post-experimental
questionnaire, these two groups cannot be identiﬁed.
Another argument for the poor results under quantity competition is mentioned by
Huck et al. (2001, 2002) themselves, Lau and Leung (2007), and Santos-Pinto (2008):
disadvantageous inequality aversion.10 Since both reaction curves slope downward, none
of them enters the Pareto superior set relative to the equilibrium of the Cournot game
(see Figure 4, i). Hence, a ﬁrm’s Stackelberg leader proﬁt exceeds its Cournot proﬁt
and its Cournot proﬁt exceeds its Stackelberg follower proﬁt: Stackelberg competition
disadvantages the following ﬁrm relative to Cournot competition.11
Since both reaction curves slope upward under price competition, that is, each of them
9There are experimental studies in which higher payoﬀs do not cause a better performance of the
participants. For a survey, see Camerer and Hogarth (1999).
10For a discussion of disadvantageous inequality aversion in ultimatum bargaining games, see Gu¨th
et al. (1982). For a survey on ultimatum bargaining behavior, see Gu¨th and Tietz (1990).
11For a detailed presentation, see Hamilton and Slutsky (1990).
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Figure 4: Reaction curves and Pareto superior sets.
enters the Pareto superior set relative to the equilibrium of the Cournot game (see Fig-
ure 4, ii), a ﬁrm’s Stackelberg follower proﬁt exceeds its Stackelberg leader proﬁt and
its Stackelberg leader proﬁt exceeds its Cournot proﬁt: Stackelberg competition advan-
tages both ﬁrms relative to Cournot competition. Hence, Huck et al. (2002) conjecture
that endogenous Stackelberg price competition might be more likely to be observed in
the laboratory than endogenous Stackelberg quantity competition. Their conjecture
is supported by a partially successful application of Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) model
of inequality aversion by Huck et al. (2001): on the one hand, their data suggest that
Stackelberg followers are averse to disadvantageous inequality; on the other hand, Stack-
elberg leaders seem to be advantageous inequality loving. Ku¨bler and Mu¨ller’s ﬁndings
on exogenous Stackelberg price competition are in line with this conjecture.
5 Conclusion
I have summarized and analyzed experimental studies on duopolistic quantity competi-
tion with homogeneous products and duopolistic price competition with heterogeneous
products. First, I ﬁnd that only a handful of experiments checking Cournot competition
against Stackelberg competition have been conducted yet and that only one of these
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experiments involves price competition. Second, I assert that Stackelberg equilibrium
outcomes are seldom under quantity competition and that the Stackelberg equilibrium
prediction seems to be more appropriate under price competition. Third, I get that
experimental designs seem to be in the domain of the theory as long as the auxiliary
hypothesis that ﬁrms act like subjects is taken to be true.
Tasks seem to be “simple”. Contemplating whether there has been “suﬃcient” time for
learning, the picture is mixed. Some sessions consist of 30 rounds. Others only have
10 rounds. Incentives seem to be “adequate” because payoﬀs are chosen to reﬂect op-
portunity costs, but losses from playing a disequilibrium strategy can be low. Following
Smith and Walker (1993), I argue that this may be an argument for the poor results.
Another reason is mentioned by Huck et al. (2001, 2002) themselves: disadvantageous
inequality aversion. Their reasoning is supported by a partially successful application of
Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) model of inequality aversion.
Due to the methodological problems mentioned above, I reason that the quantity com-
petition models have not been falsiﬁed so far. However, doubts seem to be appropriate.
Therefore, I suggest further research on the adequacy of incentives. This is of particu-
lar importance in experiments on endogenous competition models. Concerning the high
complexity of those experiments, high decision costs are likely to be expected. Increasing
the number of rounds solely may not suﬃce.
In consideration of the results of experiments on quantity competition models, Ku¨bler
and Mu¨ller’s (2002) ﬁndings are surprising. Since decision costs are likely to be the
same as those under quantity competition, incentives cannot be assumed to be stronger.
However, according to Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) model of inequality aversion, as in
the experiments on quantity competition, subjects seem to be advantageous inequality
loving. Aside, many price competition models have not been tested yet (see Table 4 in
the appendix). So far, I reason that there is not enough experimental research to speak
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of evidence for the price competition models.
Independently of the results of further experimental research, treating ﬁrms as economic
agents with the sole objective of proﬁt maximization seems to be problematic in the
case of oligopolistic competition: if only few ﬁrms are present in a market, these ﬁrms
are large and complex. Typically, they are characterized by a separation of ownership
and management. This fact is not taken into account in any model. However, such
institutional arrangements may be important. For example, Vickers (1985), Fershtman
and Judd (1987), and Sklivas (1987) show that strategic delegation can serve as a com-
mitment device in a Cournot oligopoly market.
Appendix
Variable
Model Experiment
Author(s) Order of moves Author(s) Course of action
Quantity
Cournot exogenous
Huck et al. (2001)
pen and paper
Fonseca et al. (2005)
Stackelberg exogenous Huck et al. (2001) pen and paper
Saloner (1987) and
endogenous Mu¨ller (2006) computer
Ellingsen (1995)
Hamilton and Slutsky (1990):
endogenous Huck et al. (2002) computer
“action commitment”
Hamilton and Slutsky (1990):
endogenous Fonseca et al. (2006) computer
“observable delay”
van Damme and Hurkens (1999) endogenous Fonseca et al. (2005) pen and paper
Price
Cournot exogenous Ku¨bler and Mu¨ller (2002) computer
Stackelberg exogenous Ku¨bler and Mu¨ller (2002) computer
Hamilton and Slutsky (1990):
endogenous no experiments yet
“action commitment”
Hamilton and Slutsky (1990):
endogenous no experiments yet
“observable delay”
van Damme and Hurkens (2004) endogenous no experiments yet
Pastine and Pastine (2004) endogenous no experiments yet
Amir and Stepanova (2006) endogenous no experiments yet
Table 4: Models and experiments.
Source: Author.
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